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Rent Dissipation and Potential Rents in  
the North Sea Herring Fishery 
 
Trond Bjørndal, Daniel V. Gordon and Mintewab Bezabih 
ABSTRACT. The paper assesses the potential for rent generation, distinguishing 
between resource and intra-marginal rent, in the North Sea herring fishery. A 
bioeconomic model combining fish population dynamics with the economic structure of 
the fishery is used to generate equations to compute the different rents. A combination of 
biological data with vessel-level economic data for UK pelagic trawlers is employed in 
estimations. In order to assess the dynamics of both resource and intra-marginal rent 
generation, the model is evaluated under various assumptions with regard to price, cost, 
and discount rate. Potential total rents are measured at £90-91 million annually of which 
resource rent makes up about £89.0 million with intra-marginal rent measured in the 
order of only £2.0 million. This compares to an actual rent in 2007 estimated at £ 16.3 
million. The results show that, in this fishery, rent is dissipated almost entirely due to 
excess effort while very little is dissipated due to suboptimal stock size. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Given the current state of the economic health of marine fisheries worldwide (World 
Bank 2009; FAO 2012), management measures that are effective in bringing the 
resources back to a healthy state hinge on accurate evaluation of the current performance 
as well as the potential performance of the fishery. The concept of resource rent has been 
a key indicator of performance in the fishery and has been a dominant theme in the 
fisheries literature (Holman and Wilen 2005; Coglan and Pascoe 1999; World Bank 
2009). Dissipation of resource rent is due to mismanagement of the resource (e.g. 
Bjørndal and Munro 2012). From this, the degree to which a regulated fishery brings 
about desirable outcomes from what would emerge under open access is measured by 
rent generated (e.g. Squires and Kirkley 1995; Bertignac et al. 2001; Asche et al. 2008, 
2009; World Bank 2009; Bjørndal and Munro, 2012).  
  Maximum resource rent is obtained by optimising effort and harvest as well as 
stock size. Without regulation, the common property nature of most fishery resources and 
the associated free entry of factor inputs lead to the dissipation of resource rent (Gordon 
1954; Homans and Wilen 2005). While this is true, Copes (1972) argues that the notion 
that open access fisheries yield no rent ignores the rent that may be earned by intra-
marginal factor units employed in the fishery.
1
 Furthermore, since unit operating costs are 
sensitive to stock size (Bjørndal 1988; Hannesson 2007), there will be rents associated 
with this ‘stock effect’ (Stoeven and Quaas 2012). What this tells us is that fisheries rent 
is really the combination of resource rent and intra-marginal rent, in which the latter is 
associated with the earnings of intra-marginal factor units. Thus, resource rent is the 
                                                          
1
 See, Coglan and Pascoe (1999); Bromley (2008); Geen and Nayar (1988); Nugeyen et al. (2012).    
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return to the fish as an input while intra-marginal rent results from cost differences in 
harvesting intra-marginal units. Cost differences for intra-marginal units result from the 
concavity of the aggregate harvest function.  
  The purpose of this paper is to assess the resource and intra-marginal rents for the 
North Sea herring fishery under current as well as optimal management. This is of great 
interest, as such a study has not previously been undertaken.  
Data for the UK pelagic trawl fleet are used to approximate the profit structure for 
an average vessel fishing herring in the North Sea. Our empirical strategy follows 
Arnason (2011), who estimates a global fishery model and obtains numerical estimates of 
the rent loss in the world’s ocean capture fisheries. The Sunken Billions report (World 
Bank, 2009) assesses the alternative trajectories of the management of global fisheries 
and estimates a maximum resource rent of $50 billion per year under optimal 
management, which compares to current aggregate rents of zero. In other words, rents are 
depleted due to overexploitation of stocks and excessive application of fishing effort.  
The major departure of our study involves the use of a dynamic bioeconomic model 
that combines population dynamics with the economic structure of the fishery to estimate 
resource rent and intra-marginal rent under optimal levels of stock and harvest. 
Approaching rent in this way enables a more transparent assessment of the effectiveness 
of alternative management instruments on the dynamics of the two types of rent in a 
unified framework.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II defines resource and intra-marginal 
rent and provides a review of the relevant literature on rent in the fisheries. This is 
followed in section III by an overview of the North Sea herring fishery as well as a 
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description of UK fleet and vessel statistics including an evaluation of current economic 
profits in the fishery. A bioeconomic model, consisting of a model of population 
dynamics and an aggregate profit model, is formulated and conditions for a dynamic 
optimum are derived in section IV. Estimation, calibration and simulation results of the 
dynamic optimization are reported in section V. Concluding comments are offered in the 
final section.    
 
II. RESOURCE AND INTRA-MARGINAL RENTS 
The concept of resource rent extends from the more general concept of returns to a factor 
in fixed supply and is defined as the payment to a resource in fixed supply (Robinson 
1939; Arnason 2011). With supply restricted, the marginal net benefit of using the 
resource is positive and represents rent. Technically, the difference between marginal 
revenue at the socially optimal level of output (the level at which the marginal social 
revenue equals the marginal social cost) and the opportunity costs of labour and capital 
(social cost) is the rent yielded by the resource (Cook and Copes 1987; Copes 1972).
2
 
  Rent in the fishery is maximised at the output level corresponding to the maximum 
present value of returns from the fishery, subject to resource dynamics, with supply price 
equal to the shadow value of the resource.  If the fishery is not optimally managed, 
marginal returns will be less than the shadow price. If there are no restrictions on the 
harvest rate the price associated with supply will be zero and consequently rent is zero. 
This coincides with the popular statement that for an open access fishery with no harvest 
constraints, resource rent is zero (Arnason 2011). 
                                                          
2
 It is important to note that resource rent depends on prices of capital, technology and previous investments 
as well as variable inputs and not only the resource itself. 
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Even in open access where the resource rent accrued is zero fishermen could enjoy 
benefits from the fishery in the form of producers’ surplus (Copes 1972; Jonsson and 
Libecap 1982; Jonsson 1995; see also economic analysis of UK fleet below).  Producers’ 
surplus consists of the rent that intra-marginal inputs of labour and capital receive 
(Stoeven and Quass 2012; Edwards 2005). There are two sources of intra-marginal rent; 
those associated with efficiency differentials of units of factors employed in the fishery
3
 
and those due to the stock effect.  This latter effect exists due to increasing cost of harvest 
with respect to the level of the stock. This is an important point; constant unit cost per 
harvesting implies no intra-marginal rent but costs increasing per unit of harvest with 
respect to declining stock levels will generate intra-marginal rent. Increasing costs with 
respect to harvest implies that the harvest function and, the dual profit function are 
concave in inputs (Bjørndal, 1987). 
Figure 1 shows profit and marginal profit curves for different levels of harvest and 
helps clarify the distinct values of resource and intra-marginal rent. The profit function 
increases at a decreasing rate because of the concavity of the harvest function. As stock 
levels decrease, the unit cost of harvest increases, resulting in concavity of the harvest 
function. From this the marginal profit function, i.e., the derived demand for fish, is 
downward sloping. Under regulation optimal harvest is enforced at H*, resulting in a 
return to the fixed factor, resource rent, of the rectangular area of ABDE. In other words, 
resource rent per unit is constant. The triangular area BCD is defined as intra-marginal 
rent (producer surplus), i.e., return to factors of production in excess of opportunity cost. 
The sum of intra-marginal and resource rents is the total variable profit associated with 
                                                          
3
 Copes (1972) argues that efficiency differences across vessels and differences in opportunity for factor 
inputs can generate intra-marginal rent.  
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the extraction of a fishery resource, i.e., total revenues minus variable costs (Arnason 
2011). 
 Understanding the distinction between the concepts of resource and intra-marginal 
rents has important resource management implications. In particular, the maximisation of 
overall societal benefits from fishery resources depends on whom the respective benefits 
accrue to and who manages the resource.
4
  In line with this, Bromley (1990, 2009) argues 
that exclusive property rights necessary for sustainability disregards the distributive 
aspects of resource use. Indeed, Bromley (1990) argues that the efficiency criterion 
(Pareto test)
5
 does not fully comprehend what the public and its decision makers need and 
expect from economists as the collective interest transcends the reductionist Pareto rule.  
  Similarly, Copes (1972) argues that the consideration of resource rent should be 
balanced with that of competing social benefits derived from the exploitation of a fishery. 
Indeed, the benefits to society of renewable resources are maximised when resource rent, 
consumer surplus and producer surplus are taken into consideration in resource 
harvesting (Copes 1972; Stoeven and Quaas 2012).  
Stoeven and Quaas (2012) extend Copes (1972) by focusing on the dynamic 
aspects of the fishery and the distribution of benefits from a fishery resource when stock 
effects are taken into account. Accordingly, they find that sole ownership increases the 
                                                          
4
 A common theme is that rent is generated from a reduction in fishing effort. One might also suspect that 
optimal management may alter the structure of the harvest process itself and moreover, the basic supply-
demand relationships in the market (Homas and Wilen 2005; Arnason 1993).  
5
 Efficiency via the Pareto test does not lend itself to precise or objective measurement of the ability of the 
gainers to compensate the losers and does not lead to an unambiguous improvement in social welfare. 
There is no discernible social consensus for economic efficiency via the Pareto test (Mishan 1980; Bromley 
1990).  
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present value of consumer surplus and labour surplus if harvesting costs do not depend on 
stock size. With stock effect however, only producers are bound to definitely benefit, 
with consumers and labourers (fishermen) preferring open access to sole ownership. This 
is because harvesting productivity increases with stock size and optimal steady-state 
stock size under sole ownership is lower with the stock effect than without. This 
negatively affects labourers because the unit labour requirements are lower at high stock 
sizes. Similarly, consumers also lose out on privatization if the stock effect is strong enough and 
the discount rate small enough for the quantity supplied in the market to be small.    
 
III. THE NORTH SEA HERRING FISHERY 
North Sea autumn-spawning herring (Clupea harengus L) consists of three spawning 
stocks with spawning grounds east of Scotland, east of England and in the English 
Channel. The three stocks mix on the feeding grounds and in the central and northern 
North Sea, and it is customary by ICES and others to treat North Sea herring as one stock. 
Herring become sexually mature in age group two and can live as long as 15 years.  The 
herring fishery has a season running from May until September.   
 After World War II, the stock may have been close to the carrying capacity of the 
environment due to low fishing pressure. After this period, open access, combined with 
the development of new technologies in the 1960s and 1970s substantially increased 
fishing pressure. This caused the stock to be driven to near extinction in 1977, when a 
moratorium was introduced (Bjørndal 1988). Various regulations have been in effect ever 
since so as to allow for a sustainable fishery (Bjørndal and Lindroos 2004).   
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 Spawning stock biomass (SSB) for the period 1960-2007 is illustrated in Figure 2.  
There have been substantial variations in stock size over this period.  In 1960, the SSB 
stood at 1.85 million tonnes, increasing to almost 2.2 million tonnes in 1963.  This year 
saw the introduction of the power block
6
 that led to rapid stock depletion, with the stock 
reaching a minimum of 47,000 tonnes in 1977, when the moratorium was introduced.  
The figure shows that the stock recovered reasonably quickly.  For the years 1988-90, 
SSB averaged around 1.2 million tonnes. In the period 2001-06, SSB varied in the range 
1.3–1.8 million tonnes but it was reduced to 977,000 tonnes in 2007. The Blim7, the level 
below which the stock should not be reduced as this would endanger future sustainability 
is set at 800,000 tonnes, implying that the current fishery is sustainable. 
 Since the introduction of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction (EFJ), North Sea herring 
is jointly managed by Norway and the European Union (EU). A Total Allowable Catch 
(TAC) quota is determined for the sustainable management of the stock; Norway 
receiving a 29% share and the rest to the EU.  The sharing is largely based on the zonal 
attachment of the stock to the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Norway and the EU.  
Within the EU, the TAC is shared according to the principle of relative stability. Quotas 
are allocated among member states in such a way as to ensure the relative stability of the 
fishing activities of each member state for each stock concerned. The principle of relative 
stability is based on historical catch levels and geographical distribution for the main 
commercial species among member states. 
                                                          
6
 A mechanical winch that was used to pull in the seines, allowing for much larger nets and eventually 
larger vessels.   
7
 See Horwood (1999). 
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 Total landings of herring are also graphed in Figure 2.  Landings increased from 
about 700,000 tonnes in 1960 to almost 1.2 million tonnes in 1965, and were maintained 
at a high level into the 1970s, despite a declining stock size. Note that in the years 1968-
76, annual catches exceeded the size of the SSB
8
. Landings were reduced to 46,000 
tonnes in 1977, when the moratorium was introduced, and stayed at a low level until the 
fishery was reopened in 1981. Landings in 2006 were recorded at more than 500,000 
tonnes, falling to 400,000 tonnes in 2007. Norway often records the highest catch 
followed by Denmark. The Netherlands and UK are also important participants in the 
fishery. In 2007, UK catches were 90,500 tonnes.  
Regulations of the fishery vary from country to county.  In Norway, vessels are 
regulated with individual quotas that are not transferable, whereas in Denmark and the 
Netherlands, individual transferable quotas are used. In the UK, firms receive quota 
allocations via producer organisations but larger companies can receive allocations 
directly from the government.  The quotas are to a certain degree transferable.   
In Figure 3, recruitment
 
in year t+1 is plotted against spawning stock in year t.
9
 
The plot suggests recruitment is increasing in SSB but eventually levels off and declines.  
These data will form the basis for estimation of recruitment functions in empirical work. 
 
  
                                                          
8
 Catches include juvenile herring that are part of the total biomass but not the SSB. For example, in 1974 
total landings were about 275,000 tonnes. Total biomass and SSB, at the beginning of the year, were 
912,000 and 162,000 tonnes, respectively. By the time the fishing season started, both total biomass and 
SSB would have grown. Thus, the harvest of 275,000 tonnes would be from a larger stock, and a substantial 
part of it would be immature herring. 
9
 The data available for analysis is annual data for the period 1960-2007. The data includes information on 
recruitment, spawning stock biomass and landings. The data are available from the authors on request. 
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United Kingdom fleet and vessel economics 
For the UK, pelagic trawlers over 40 m harvest most of the herring. These vessels 
are based predominantly in Shetland and the north east of Scotland. The vessels harvest 
mackerel, herring and blue whiting, of which mackerel is most important in terms of 
quantity and value.  Mackerel and herring are mainly used for direct human consumption, 
while blue whiting is used for reduction into fish meal and oil.  All three species represent 
targeted fisheries occurring in different seasons of the year and do not overlap in the 
catches.  
 The price of herring has been increasing in recent years and was recorded at 
£290/tonne in 2007. Herring is sold into an international market in competition with close 
substitutes such as Norwegian spring spawning and Icelandic herring.  It is the total 
supply of herring of which North Sea herring is a small part that, in conjunction with 
demand, will determine price. 
 For the UK fishery we have available revenue data and some fleet statistics for 
pelagic trawls for 2007 (Table 1).  
Table 2 also reports landings for each of the three species that make up total 
catch. In 2007, mackerel represented a 42.4% share of total catch quantity.  Herring 
represented a 29.09% share and, blue whiting and others made up the remainder of total 
catch.   
Cost data are also available for 2007 from Lappo (2013) and reported in Table 2. 
Column 2 reports accounting values and column 3 opportunity values (as defined below). 
The cost data represent vessel averages for total landings. For accounting values, fuel and 
other operating costs represented more than £1.5 million with crew share adding just less 
SNF Working Paper No. 26/13 
10 
 
than £1.0 million. Total accounting costs for 2007 amounted to £3.7 million, which 
divides out to be £375.8/tonne. Based on average landings and revenue characteristics for 
2007, vessel accounting profit is measured at £419,920.7 or average profit of £43.2/tonne 
 Lappo (2013) modifies the accounting data to obtain opportunity values. Labour 
is remunerated according to a share system and in 2007 average crew share per 
crewmember was £81,993.9. This is believed to be higher than the alternative cost of 
labour, which for these fishermen might be working on supply ships in the North Sea.  
For the current purpose, labour cost is set at £65,000 per man-year so that total annual 
labour (full-time equivalent, Table 1) costs represent £455,000. Further, capital costs are 
represented by depreciation and interest, where the latter should be estimated on the basis 
of the alternative/opportunity cost of capital. Capital costs are measured using the 
insurance value of the vessel on the assumption that this represents the alternative cost of 
boat and gear.
10
 The interest rate is set at 5% with depreciation over 15 years. Using the 
annuity method, annual depreciation and interest opportunity value represent 
£1,235,161.4.  The opportunity value
11
 modifications are listed in column 3 of Table 2. 
Again based on average landings and revenue characteristics for 2007, vessel opportunity 
profit is much lower and measured at £281,812.3 or average profit of £28.96/tonne. 
 Next, using opportunity values we measure actual profit only for the herring 
fishery. In 2007, herring price is £290/tonne and UK herring catch is reported as 90,585 
tonnes. We allocate fixed costs on a pro rata basis, i.e., according to proportion of herring 
in total catch (29.09% in 2007). This gives a 2007 average cost (opportunity value) of 
                                                          
10
 Insurance value for the vessel is only available for 2006 and valued at £12,630,800. Lappo (2013) 
assumes this value for 2007 adjusted for inflation. 
11
 Fuel and other operating costs, and insurance, repairs and maintenance maintain their accounting value as 
opportunity value.  
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£390/tonne and results in a profit of -£9.1 million. On the other hand, if we allocate no 
portion of fixed costs to the herring fishery based on an argument that it is a marginal 
fishery for the fleet with the mackerel fishery as the most important in terms of catches 
and revenue (Bjørndal 1987) it would be profitable as long as revenues cover variable 
costs.
12
 Variable costs per vessel, including repairs and maintenance, amount to 
£2,559,895.3 per year or £263.1/tonne. With the other assumptions in place, this would 
give rise to a profit for the UK herring fishery in 2007 of £2.4 million. It is interesting to 
note that, due to the sharing system in place in this fishery, some resource rents accrue to 
the crew.  
 In the next section, a bioeconomic model is estimated and calibrated to define 
optimal stock and harvest levels and predict potential rents. Based on potential total rents 
we calculate both resource and intra-marginal rents.  
 
IV. THE BIOECONOMIC MODEL 
Changes in the biomass of a fish stock over time will come from additions to the stock 
due to recruitment and natural growth, and deductions from the stock due to natural 
mortality and harvesting. The interactions between recruitment, natural growth, natural 
mortality and harvesting have been fundamental in the development of the model of 
population dynamics, which has previously been used as part of bioeconomic analyses of 
North Sea herring (Bjørndal 1987; 1988). The following delay-difference equation will 
be used to explain changes in the biomass over time: 
                                                          
12
 A good review of allocating costs in public arena is found in a collection of papers edited by Young 
(1983). 
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              [1] 
where St+1 spawning stock biomass in year t+1 and Ht is harvest in period t, both 
measured in tonnes.  is recruitment to the stock, taking place with delay of  
periods. Z and M represent natural growth and mortality, respectively.   
The first argument on the right-hand side of equation [1] denotes stock changes 
due to natural growth, natural mortality, and harvesting. In the model, it is assumed that 
harvesting occurs in a short season at the beginning of the period.
13
 The escapement, 
, grows at the net instantaneous growth rate Z–M. The second argument on the 
right-hand side of equation [1] represents addition to the stock due to recruitment, which 
is assumed to occur at discrete time intervals. Moreover, recruits will normally join the 
parent population several years after spawning. We postulate that   
                   [2] 
where   is the number of recruits to the juvenile population as a function of the 
previous periods spawning biomass. A certain fraction, λ, will survive the juvenile stage 
and join the spawning stock, so that 
                 [3] 
is the number of recruits joining the spawning stock with a delay of γ periods. The delay 
occurs while the juveniles mature to spawning age. Letting w denote the weight of new 
recruits, we get 
               [4] 
                                                          
13
 Alternatively, we could assume that the fishery takes place at the end of the period, without affecting the 
qualitative nature of the model. 
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where  denotes recruitment in weight to the spawning stock. 
 Herring spawn in September and the following year recruits, called zero-group 
herring, join the juvenile population as indicated by equation [2]. After another two years 
the survivors (equation [3]) become sexually mature and join the spawning or adult 
population (equation [4]). Thus for this species, γ = 2, and the delay between spawning 
and recruitment to the spawning stock is three years.  
Before proceeding to the production function, the behaviour of the model under 
natural conditions will be considered. In the absence of fishing, equation [1] is reduced to  
              [  
Under natural conditions, a fish population will grow towards its carrying capacity, which 
is the upper limit of the stock size  as determined by environmental conditions. 
However, in equation [1 ], it is assumed that Z and M are constants or . In 
reality, both natural growth and mortality will be density-dependent; the former because 
there will be relatively more food available to a small stock than to a large one and for the 
latter because predation and cannibalism depend on stock size. From this we can write 
,  and , and equation [1] can be restated as 
              [5] 
 We assume the fishery is managed by a sole owner, with the objective to 
maximize the present value of net revenues from the fishery. The net revenue function is 
given by 
                 [6]  
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Maximizing equation [6], subject to changes in the population level given by equation [5] 
gives a discrete time dynamic bioeconomic model, with  and  as control and state 
variable, respectively. The method of Lagrange multipliers can be used to derive 
equilibrium conditions for an optimum (Clark 1976):   
          [7] 
where , r is the interest rate and   is the discounted value of the shadow 
price. Carrying out the optimization, an implicit expression for the optimal spawning 
stock is derived: 
          [8] 
The term  is the marginal stock effect (MSE) in a discrete time nonlinear 
model (Bjørndal 1988). The MSE represents the impact of stock density on harvesting 
costs. This effect will cause an increase in the optimal stock level, in steady state.  
Intuitively, it can be understood by considering that an increase in stock size will increase 
catch per unit effort and hence reduce unit-harvesting costs.  
 
V. DYNAMIC OPTIMISATION 
The functional structure of the model of population dynamics
14
 that will be used in the 
estimation of the optimal stock level is the combination of the Ricker stock-recruitment 
function and the linear net growth function.  The estimated model of population dynamics 
is thus:   
)S.(
t
)S..(
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33 10960
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14
 Various functional forms both for stock recruitment and the net growth function have been estimated and 
are available from the authors on request.   
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where the carrying capacity, , is 2,386,000 tonnes, stock level corresponding to 
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), Smsy, is 1,284,000 tonnes with MSY at 424,300 
tonnes. 
 The model population dynamics is illustrated in Figure 4. To facilitate graphical 
representation of a function involving a time lag, a steady-state stock level is assumed. 
The harvest quantity is represented by the difference between St+1 and the 45◦ line. It is 
noteworthy that the estimated steady-state harvest quantity is fairly constant over a wide 
range of stock values. 
The harvest in period t is defined as: 
 H(              [10] 
 where Kt  is fishing effort in period t, and a, b and g are parameters defining the harvest 
production characteristics. The number of participating vessels is used as a measure of 
fishing effort. Estimated parameters for equation [10] are based on Bjørndal and Conrad 
(1987) and calibrated as a=0.26, b=0.95, and g=0.5621. The parameter g is the output 
elasticity of stock size and indicates harvest will decrease with decreasing stock size, but 
relatively less than the change in stock size.  The parameter b is the output elasticity of 
effort and indicates that increased effort is met with increased harvest but slightly less 
than one for one.  
The schooling behaviour of herring has permitted the development of very 
effective means of harvesting. With modern fish finding equipment, harvesting can be 
viable even at very low stock levels.  
We assume cost per unit of effort is constant. Under this assumption, we can write 
the cost function as: 
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            [11] 
where c is the cost per vessel per fishing season, which includes a normal return on 
capital. Using equations [10] and [11], industry profit is defined as: 
          [12] 
where p is unit price of harvest. 
  According to the cost data for 2007 annual operating and fixed costs for a pelagic 
trawler is £3,795,056.7.  In 2007, herring represented 29.1% of catches.  We will assume 
that the costs in the herring fishery represent the same proportion out of total cost.  Thus, 
the cost of operating one vessel in the herring fishery for one season is £1,104,000.  We 
consider this the total variable cost of operating one vessel for one season, as such, it is 
the variable rental cost of operating a vessel for one season.  Moreover, as we assume that 
cost per unit effort is constant, effort (i.e., the number of vessels) can be increased or 
decreased, without impacting total vessel variable cost.   
The analysis of potential rents should be based on prices that will prevail in the 
future. We will set the price at £ 300/tonne in the analysis of optimal management and the 
analysis of potential rents, both corresponding to steady state levels. On this basis, we can 
establish the cost function as: 
                  [13] 
and from this industry rents: 
         [14] 
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It is important to note that the underlying assumption is that price and cost conditions for 
all countries participating in the North Sea herring fishery are similar to those in the 
United Kingdom.  
To find optimal  and the corresponding , we solve equation [8], using the 
estimated model of population dynamics, [9]
15
 and the profit function, [14]. As the model 
is nonlinear, the solution is found by numerical methods.  Results are presented in Table 
3 for discount rates between zero and 10%.   
For the case with a zero discount rate, the optimal stock level is 1,409.7 million 
tonnes.  Increasing the discount rate to 5% reduces the optimal level to 1,365.5 million 
tonnes. For all discount rates evaluated,  is greater than Smsy.
 
It is also interesting to 
note that actual stock is larger than S
*
 in 2005 (1.621 million tonnes) but very much 
smaller in 2007 (0.977 million tonnes). Optimal harvest for all discount rates is fairly 
stable at about 427,000 tonnes. This is because the estimated model of population 
dynamics is fairly flat over a wide range of stock values. 
The estimate of cost of effort is based on data for only one year, and it is difficult 
to allocate costs among the different fisheries.  For this reason we will also presents 
results on the assumption that the cost of operating one vessel in the herring fishery for 
one season is £ 1,435,200, i.e., one third higher than in the base case.  The assumption of 
a £300/tonne price is maintained.  Results are presented in Table 4. Under these 
alternative assumptions, optimal stock level is higher by about 50,000 tonnes but steady 
state harvest is somewhat less by about 3,000 tonnes. 
                                                          
15
 Our solution method for the optimal stock and harvest is based on the underlying assumption that 
, i.e., steady state stock 
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A sensitivity analysis was also undertaken for a price of £ 350/tonne, with cost per 
vessel per season at £1,104,000.  For a 5% discount rate, the optimal stock level declines 
to 1.346 million tonnes with optimal harvest increasing by about 1,000 tonnes.  
Overall, these results are somewhat robust to changes in price and cost of effort 
with the optimal stock level in the range 1.3-1.4 million tonnes. 
We turn now to calculating potential rents, and resource and intra-marginal rents 
in the North Sea herring fishery. We estimate potential rents using equation [14] based on 
stock and harvest estimates as presented in Tables 3 and 4. Potential rents is separated 
into resource rent and intra-marginal rent in the following way;
16
 
Resource rent =              [15] 
Intra-marginal rent =  
While equation [15] is the expression we use for computing rent and intra-marginal 
rent, below we show an alternative derivation that analytically distinguishes between two 
sources of intra-marginal rent; stock effect and factor efficiency differential effect.  
Following Stoeven and Quaas (2012), the optimal harvesting plan is derived based 
on equation [17], which is a combination of equations [10] and [12] and where stock is a 
choice variable. Note that harvest is a function of stock and taking the partial derivative 
of equation [17] with respect to stock would imply that taking a partial derivative with 
respect to harvest as well.  
       [17] 
The first order condition becomes: 
                                                          
16
 See Arnason (2006, 2008, 2011).   
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        [18]  
Rearranging [18] gives 
        [19] 
Accordingly, the expression of the intra-marginal rent is transformed to: 
   [20] 
The term within the square bracket in equation [20] captures the expressions 
essential in understanding the sources of intra-marginal rent. The first term   captures 
the stock effect (the value of the marginal increase in harvesting productivity). By 
implication, therefore, this term is associated with the stock effect in intra-marginal rent. 
The second term is constituted of the difference between price and , the change in 
marginal cost with respect to harvest, which is the source of intra-marginal rent 
associated with efficiency differentials. It should be noted that because of our assumption 
of constant marginal and average cost across boats,  is zero, implying that in our 
analysis intra-marginal rent is only derived from the ‘stock effect’.  
Resource rent is equal to marginal profit evaluated at the optimal harvest level 
multiplied by optimal harvest level. Intra-marginal rent is equal to variable profits 
evaluated at optimal levels of harvest and stock minus resource rent. Potential rent, 
resource and intra-marginal rent, is evaluated under various discount and cost scenarios 
and the results reported in Table 5.  
The top half of the table reports results for a price of £300 per tonne and total 
costs of £1,104,000 per vessel. Potential total rents are measured at about £90-91 million 
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annually and vary little across alternative discount rates. Resource rent makes up 98% of 
this value at about £89.0 million with intra-marginal rent measured as the residual in the 
order of only £2.0 million. Although intra-marginal rent is small, this is what one would 
expect in a mature fishery. Resource rent represents roughly 69% of total revenue.
17
  
The bottom half of the table repeats the exercise using the same herring price but 
for an increased total cost of £1,468,320 per vessel. Here we observe that potential total 
rent has fallen to about £79.0 million annually with resource rent representing about 96% 
of this value. Intra-marginal rent is now measured at about £2.5 million annually. 
 Table 5 represents potential rents for the entire North Sea herring fishery. 
Returning to the UK herring fleet and noting that the UK share of total harvest for herring 
is about 14%, results in a potential profit of about £12.7 million annually. With current 
profit for the UK herring fishery calculated at about -£9.1 to £2.2 million, depending on 
how fixed costs are allocated, efficient management of the fishery based on optimal stock 
and harvest levels allows for substantial improvement in profitable returns to the fishery. 
 
Rent dissipation 
We are now able to analyze rent dissipation. This is done in Table 6, for three scenarios. 
In scenario 1, ‘actual 2007 conditions’, we assume that UK technology, price and 
revenues are representative for the entire North Sea herring fishery. This year a total 
catch of 400,000 tonnes was harvested from a stock of 977,000 tonnes. With UK 
harvesting efficiency, a total fleet of 217.6 vessels would have been applied to the 
fishery, generating a total rent of £16.3 million. 
                                                          
17
 It is interesting to note that Bjørndal (2008) found potential rent in the Norwegian spring spawning 
herring fishery to be 69% of revenue, based on 2006 price and cost data. 
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In scenario 2, ‘2007 conditions with elimination of excess capacity’, we maintain 
2007 catch and stock levels but allow for elimination of excess capacity. In this scenario 
we allow vessels to harvest to capacity and results show that the harvest could have been 
landed by as few as 38.8 boats
18
 (as compared to 217.6 in reality) and would have 
generated total rents of £87.2 million. 
 In scenario 3, ‘Optimal policy (5% discount rate)’, optimal management based on 
results from Table 5 where stock is allowed to increase to optimal levels (1,365.5 
thousand tonnes) and optimal harvest is set at 427.6 thousand tonnes. The number of 
vessels increases slightly but the higher harvest levels results in a rent of £90.8 million  
 Table 6 is very informative in identifying the cause of rent dissipation as excess 
capacity. Moving from scenario 1 to 2 the only modification is allowing individual 
vessels to harvest to the capacity of the technology available and from this we measure 
greater than a 5-fold increase in rent. Moving to optimal fisheries management does 
increase harvest and rent somewhat but relatively minor compared to removing excess 
capacity in the fishery.  
 These results show that, in this fishery, rent is dissipated almost entirely due to 
excess effort while very little is dissipated due to suboptimal stock size. 
 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper was to undertake an analysis of current rent as well as potential 
rents under optimal management and different economic scenarios for the North Sea 
herring fishery. An important contribution of the paper has been to estimate rent on the 
                                                          
18
 Vessel capacity is based on existing UK technology. 
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basis of a dynamic bioeconomic model, an approach that is not common in the literature.  
Moreover, we have been able to estimate both resource rent and intra-marginal rent for 
the UK herring fishery. 
  Optimal stock levels are estimated to be in the range 1.3–1.4 million tonnes. The 
estimates of optimal stock level are higher than the stock level giving maximum 
sustainable yield and compares to a 2007 stock level of 977,000 tonnes.  Our results are 
consistent with the management scheme agreed between the EU and Norway, where the 
aim is to secure a spawning stock biomass over 1.3 million tonnes. Optimal harvest is 
predicted at about 427,000 tonnes.    
Potential total rents are measured at £90-91 million annually and vary little across 
alternative discount rates. Resource rent makes up 98% of this value at about £89.0 
million with intra-marginal rent measured in the order of only £2.0 million. This 
compares to an actual rent in 2007 estimated at £ 16.3 million.  
Another major contribution of the paper is to analyse rent dissipation. The results 
show that, based on 2007 conditions, in this fishery, rent is dissipated almost entirely due 
to excess effort while very little is dissipated due to suboptimal stock size. 
 The estimations are based on UK harvesting efficiency. As noted in section III, 
there is limited transferability of quota in the UK and Norway, while Denmark hasITQs 
in their pelagic sector. Thus, the efficiency of the Danish fleet may be higher than that of 
the British and Norwegian fleets so that the magnitudes of excess capacity and rent loss 
may be somewhat overestimated. This remains an issue for further research. 
Nevertheless, it is not likely to change the qualitative nature of the results. 
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 All in all, the results presented in this paper are very much in line with the 
predictions presented in the Sunken Billions report (World Bank, 2009). 
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TABLE 1 
Fleet Statistics 2007 
Total Landings (tonnes) 311,362 
 Value
 £, millions   
130.6 
Avg. value £/t  
419 
Landings (tonnes)  
Mackerel 132,304 
Herring 90,585 
Blue Whiting 56,466 
 
Avg. value £/t 
 
Mackerel 663 
Herring 290 
Blue Whiting 119 
  
Vessels 32 
Crew 12 
Crew- 
Full time equivalent  
7 
Source: Lappo (2013). 
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TABLE 2 
 UK Pelagic Trawl over 40m. Revenues and Costs: 2007 
 Accounting Values Opportunity Values 
Crew
a)
  983,926.8 455,000 
Fuel and other operating 
costs
b)
  
1,534,690.8 1,534,690.8 
Insurance, repairs and 
maintenance  
570,204.5 570,204.5 
Interest and depreciation on 
capital 
568,127.2 1,235,161.4 
Total Vessel Costs 3,656,949.3  3,795,056.7 
Average Cost/t 375.8  390.0 
   
Profit  419,920.7  281,813.3 
Avg. Profit/t 43.16  28.96 
a) 
All values in £. 
b) 
Commission, harbor dues, subscriptions and levies, shore labour, fuel and oil, boxes, 
crew travel, food stores and other expenses. 
Source: Lappo (2013). 
SNF Working Paper No. 26/13 
31 
 
 
TABLE  3 
Estimates of optimal stock level S* (‘000 tonnes) and the corresponding harvest H* (‘000 
tonnes).  Price = £ 300/tonne.  Cost per vessel per season = £ 1,104,000. 
Discount rate S*   H*   
0.0 1,409.7 425.0 
0.035 1,378.6 427.0 
0.05 1,365.5 427.6 
0.10 1,322.2 428.9 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Estimates of optimal stock level S* (‘000 tonnes) and the corresponding harvest H*. 
(‘000 tonnes).  Price = £ 300/tonne.  Cost per vessel per season = £ 1,468,320. 
Discount rate S*   H*   
0.0 1,456.6 420.8 
0.035 1,427.9 423.6 
0.05 1,415.8 424.5 
0.10 1,375.9 427.1 
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TABLE 5 
 Estimates of potential rents for the North Sea Herring in £ million. Price = £ 300/tonne. 
Cost per vessel per season = £ 1,104,000. 
Discount rate Total 
rents 
Resource rent Intra-marginal 
rent 
Share of 
revenue (%) 
0.0 91.0  89.1 1.92 69.8 
0.035 90.9 88.9 1.99 69.4 
0.05 90.8 88.8 1.97 69.2 
0.10 90.4 88.4 2.01 68.6 
     
 Cost per vessel per season = £ 1,468,320 
0.0 79.1 76.7 2.48 60.7 
0.035 79.0 76.5 2.53 60.2 
0.05 79.0 76.4 2.55 60.0 
0.10 78.6 76.0 2.60 59.3 
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TABLE 6 
Rent Dissipation 
Scenario Stock size ‘000 
tonnes 
Harvest ‘000 
tonnes 
Effort (fishing 
vessels) 
Total rents (£ 
million) 
1. Actual 2007 
conditions 
 977.0  400.0 217.6 16.3 
2. 2007 
conditions with 
elimination of 
excess capacity 
 977.0  400.0 38.8 87.2 
3. Optimal 
policy (5% 
discount rate) 
1,365.5  427.6             41.5 
 
90.8 
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Figure 1: Resource and Intra-marginal Rent. 
Adapted from Arnason (2011). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Spawning stock biomass and total landings 1960-2007, tonnes 
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Figure 3.  Recruitment in year t+1 (numbers) vs. spawning stock size in year t (tonnes) 
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Figure 4.  Stock dynamics (steady state stock levels), ‘000 tonnes 
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The paper assesses the potential for rent generation, distinguishing between 
resource and intra-marginal rent, in the North Sea herring fishery. A bioeconomic model 
combining fish population dynamics with the economic structure of the fishery 
is used to generate equations to compute the different rents. A combination of 
biological data with vessel-level economic data for UK pelagic trawlers is employed 
in estimations. In order to assess the dynamics of both resource and intra-marginal 
rent generation, the model is evaluated under various assumptions with regard to 
price, cost, and discount rate. Potential total rents are measured at £90-91 million 
annually of which resource rent makes up about £89.0 million with intra-marginal rent 
measured in the order of only £2.0 million. This compares to an actual rent in 2007 
estimated at £ 16.3 million. The results show that, in this fishery, rent is dissipated 
almost entirely due to excess effort while very little is dissipated due to suboptimal 
stock size.
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